On Euthanasia, The Right to Die, and Physician Responsibility

The debate about euthanasia to follow centers around the position of the AMA, as given by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association’s statement from December 4, 1973:

“The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another – mercy killing- is contrary to that for which the profession stands and is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association.

The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician should be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate family.” [1]

The first part of this statement, namely, the intentional termination of life of one person by another, has commonly been referred to as active euthanasia. Removal of life support mechanisms is coined as passive euthanasia. While the debate remains open as to whether there is a distinction between the two[2], I shall retain the usage of these terms for the purpose of this article. I shall attack the AMA position in the following respects: [1] the doctrine is based on a distinction between killing and letting die that is incorrect [2] equally construed, this document relies on a distinction either between doing and allowing, which is also irrelevant, or between intended and foreseen consequences, which is equally irrelevant [3] that in many cases killing is much more humane than letting die (thus arguing that death is not always a harm), and [4] that supporting active euthanasia is compatible with the role of a physician, and moreover that the AMA position is internally inconsistent with regards to active and passive euthanasia, as well as physician-assisted suicide (which is defined as the physician providing a patient with the necessary means to terminate their own life).

The basis for the argument that passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, while active euthanasia is always morally impermissible relies on a moral distinction between killing and letting die. What is at the heart of such a distinction? This has been a topic of numerous works, and cannot be treated exhaustively here. However, it is clear that if there is a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die, there will be no pair of cases which differ only in that one is an instance of killing and the other an instance of letting die such that the killing is equal in moral reprehensibility to the letting die. What I mean here by equal moral reprehensibility is that our intuitions would lead us to believe that either case is morally worse than the other. If such cases can be found, then the distinction between the two may point to some morally relevant difference, but the distinction between killing and letting die cannot itself be the morally relevant factor. As a matter of fact, many such cases can be found. Consider the following example from James Rachels, where it appears that letting die is equally as bad as killing:

Drowning Cousin - Smith and Jones are two greedy men who want to get rich by killing a young cousin and inheriting his money. Both enter the cousin's bathroom intending to drown him and make it look like an accident. Smith drowns the boy. As Jones walks in, he delightedly sees his nephew fall and hit his head, falling face down in the water. Jones stands ready to drown the boy if necessary, but he doesn't have to. Thus Jones lets the nephew die, while Smith kills his nephew. [3]

The only relevant difference between the two cases, as Rachels points out, is that Smith killed the child and Jones let him die. It certainly appears that each is equally morally reprehensible in their actions. One could object that in the Smith case the cousin is aware he is being murdered, which likely causes more suffering than in the Jones case, but this seems unlikely to point to a moral distinction between the two. The case could be made even stronger if we can posit an example of where letting die is worse than killing. In fact, I believe that actively euthanizing a suffering patient who otherwise would have survived in pain for months to come is an example of such a case. However, since this is the thesis I am arguing for, I clearly cannot use it as an example.[4] I shall let it stand without an example of letting die being worse that killing, relying on the fact that because the two can be shown to be equal in certain cases is enough to show the distinction is not a morally relevant one.

If the killing/letting die distinction is not morally relevant, perhaps it points to something else that is, since we commonly find that in cases killing is worse than letting die. It seems that the distinction could be founded in two main ideas. The first is that it could be based on a distinction between doing and allowing, which is what is really morally relevant. However, I believe this is also incorrect. This is demonstrated in the Rachels example of Jones and Smith stated above. Jones allowed his cousin to die, and Smith killed his cousin. Yet we concluded that they were equally morally wrong. Another such example can be given for those whom are unconvinced by the first, an example in which allowing is clearly worse than doing. The example, as posed by Jonathan Bennett, is the following:

Metallic Dust – Henry is in a sealed room where there is fine metallic dust suspended in the air. If he keeps stock still for two minutes, some dust will settle in such a way as to close a tiny electric circuit that will lead to some very undesirable consequences (say the death of an innocent). However, if he moves he shall save this innocent by preventing the dust from settling.[5]

Consider now that we revise the case slightly, such that the upshot (outcome) is the same but the action of the agent is reversed. Thus, in this example, the agent must not move in order to prevent the death of an innocent, due to the fact that he prevents the same metallic switch from closing (say his foot covers the switch). He need only move and the switch will automatically close and an innocent person may die. The only difference between this and the former case is that in the first, he must act in a negative way by staying still (thus allowing the dust to settle) so that the result is the agent’s death, and in the second case he must move his foot, allowing the switch to close, and thus killing the innocent. It is clear to see that if the agent’s action (or inaction) resulted in the death of the innocent, we would condemn him equally. We would not consider the agent in case 2 as more morally responsible than the agent in case 1; we would have no rational justification for doing so. It seems then, that there is no morally relevant distinction between doing and allowing. Other examples are provided by Bennett, including pushing a car down a hill vs. stopping it from rolling down a hill with equal effort, etc. The point demonstrated here is that doing and allowing are morally neutral actions.

The second foundation on which killing/letting die may rest is on a distinction between intended and foreseen consequences. Perhaps this lies at the heart of what is wrong with killing and not wrong with letting die in most examples. The question: is there a difference between performing an action with the intent of a certain outcome or performing the same action with the almost certain foreseeable same outcome, but having the outcome as only a foreseen consequence of the action, not its purpose? Admittedly, many examples we encounter deal with these issues, and result in us judging the act of killing as worse due to its intended, and not merely foreseen, consequences. Yet it seems that in such cases, the rightness or wrongness of an action or an omission depends entirely on a range of factors that are external to and independent of the distinction between acts and omissions itself. Among these factors are knowledge of what is at stake, the agent’s power of whether the death occurs, the sacrifice to oneself necessary to prevent the death, the likelihood that the death will come about (the probability our foreseen consequences are correct), and the agent’s motivation. Rachels claims, and I concur, that what makes most cases of killing worse than most cases of not preventing a death is the presence of these extrinsic differences. In most cases of letting die, the agent would have had to make a greater sacrifice to prevent the death, the death was less than certain, and the agent was not motivated by malice. It still strikes one as odd that to foresee the imminent death of a person and allow it to occur is less morally reprehensible than to intend his death. Suppose that the Smith and Jones example were reframed such that Jones had not intended to kill his cousin, yet was happy when he drowned and refrained from easily helping. This again doesn’t seem to weaken the case that each acted in an equally morally incorrect way. The extrinsic fact that motivation was different in the two actions can’t point to an intrinsic difference in the two cases. Again, many other examples can be given in which acting with foreseen consequences can be equally as reprehensible as intending to cause those consequences.[6] [7]What is clear is that it is not the intended vs. foreseen consequences aspect that determines the moral difference in the examples. There may again be some morally relevant distinction, but it is not this distinction.

I shall now address my points [3] that in many cases killing is much more humane than letting die (arguing that death is not always a harm), and [4] that supporting active euthanasia is compatible with the role of a physician, and moreover that the AMA position is inconsistent with regards to active and passive euthanasia. The AMA states the following in their code of ethics, in section E-2.21, Euthanasia:

“Euthanasia is the administration of a lethal agent by another person to a patient for the purpose of relieving the patient’s intolerable and incurable suffering.
It is understandable, though tragic, that some patients in extreme duress--such as those suffering from a terminal, painful, debilitating illness--may come to decide that death is preferable to life. However, permitting physicians to engage in euthanasia would ultimately cause more harm than good. Euthanasia is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks.
The involvement of physicians in euthanasia heightens the significance of its ethical prohibition. The physician who performs euthanasia assumes unique responsibility for the act of ending the patient’s life. Euthanasia could also readily be extended to incompetent patients and other vulnerable populations.
Instead of engaging in euthanasia, physicians must aggressively respond to the needs of patients at the end of life. Patients should not be abandoned once it is determined that cure is impossible. Patients near the end of life must continue to receive emotional support, comfort care, adequate pain control, respect for patient autonomy, and good communication.” (I, IV) (Issued June 1994 based on the report "Decisions Near the End of Life," adopted June 1991 (JAMA. 1992; 267: 2229-2233); Updated June 1996.)[8]

The AMA claims, “ Permitting physicians to engage in euthanasia would ultimately cause more harm than good. Euthanasia is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks.” Is it true that a physician is violating his role as healer when he ends the life of a terminally ill patient in great pain at that patient’s request? I think not. Physicians uphold the Hippocratic oath, of which the first rule is to “do no harm”, and the second, to “know thy patient”. It is not at least obviously clear that the physician in question does harm, as he is following the wishes of the patient as well as alleviating an agonizing situation. One could claim that in every case death is a harm, but this position would seem to rule out that a physician is allowed to refrain from treatment unlikely to provide a reasonable quality of life and poor results when death is sure to ensue. After all, why not always perform procedures that offer any modicum of returned function, quality of life, or even hope for the patient? Perhaps the AMA could claim under this situation that death is always a harm and hold that refraining from treatments doesn’t do harm (it merely allows it).[9] However, this would mean that physicians could not act in a positive manner that resulted in a patient’s death. But as we shall shortly see, physicians are allowed to perform such actions (such as removing current life-support machinery – doing) under certain circumstances under current policy. It would also seem to fall back on the doing/allowing distinction questioned earlier in this paper. The AMA does not seem to hold the position that death is always a harm. In section E-2.20, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, the following is stated:

“Physicians have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity and autonomy of dying patients in their care. This includes providing effective palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death.

Even if the patient is not terminally ill or permanently unconscious, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life-sustaining medical treatment in accordance with a proper substituted judgment or best interests analysis. “[10]

Clearly the AMA is not considering death a harm in the case of palliative care that hastens death, nor in the case of passive euthanasia even “if the patient is not terminally ill or permanently unconscious”! Thus clearly, even if one allowed the false distinction between doing and allowing, the current policy is inconsistent. It should also be noted that in some cases the cessation of life-supporting treatment is actually intended to bring about the death of a patient, and that this action is allowed under the current provisions of the ethical policy. In such cases, even accepting the intended/foreseen distinction would not save us from moral reprehension.[11] Furthermore, the physician is acting in his role to know his patients wishes, and if the patient were deemed to be psychologically adept and not depressed, would be acting in regards to those wishes.

The claim that such policy would be difficult to control, or would pose a serious societal risk is implausible. Physicians are afforded a level of autonomy to apply their knowledge in the best way in which is in alignment with his patients wishes. Yet at the same time physicians are governed by hospital institutional review boards, which could review cases on an individual basis and determine the best course of action, including whether euthanasia is appropriate. There is also no reason to believe that such a policy of embracing euthanasia would lead to the deaths of “to incompetent patients and other vulnerable populations”. This would likely result only from the action of malicious physicians, and such individuals would likely act in such a way without such policy. Clearly being an incompetent patient implicitly contains being unable to have the psychological aptitude necessary to make a choice on such a matter, and would rule out such people from the option of euthanasia. And what of vulnerable populations? This is just unsubstantiated fear to think that a policy allowing individuals to decide to be lethally injected would be applied in such a positive manner. Euthanasia would be a merely reactive step to patient’s wishes, and one of many treatment options given to the patient.
The AMA states at the end of the excerpt “Patients near the end of life must continue to receive emotional support, comfort care, adequate pain control, respect for patient autonomy, and good communication.” Yet I don’t see how a policy refraining from allowing a person to decide to end their own life respects their autonomy, nor is an extremely painful death a humane treatment option. Many times aggressive pain therapy can do little to alleviate the discomfort of the patient. Physicians may be limited in the amount of a drug they may prescribe do to legal issues with adverse reactions or overdose, and the patient is left to hold the pain. The patient has the right to die[12] if he wants to, as long as it is a decision he has reached after consideration and in a state of psychological stability. That many in society share this attitude is supported by the fact that Oregon has legalized physician-assisted suicide, as well as the fact that the Netherlands has legalized physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. The idea that preservation of life is the ultimate goal of any physician poses a unique problem in the question of euthanasia. I think this stems from some of the impertinent distinctions mentioned previously, and from a misunderstanding of the role of a physician. A physician should be allowed to administer lethal agents at the patient’s request; this is the humane thing to do, and this is the position that falls more in line with the values that guide physicians in our society.

Turning toward empirical considerations, it is reasonable that patients should be offered euthanasia among the treatment options to which they are entitled. A substantial number of physicians believe this is the case. For example, a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine:

“Of the 1355 eligible physicians who received our questionnaire, 938 (69 percent) responded. Forty-eight percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that euthanasia is never ethically justified, and 42 percent disagreed. Fifty-four percent thought euthanasia should be legal in some situations, but only 33 percent stated that they would be willing to perform euthanasia. Thirty-nine percent of respondents agreed with the statement that physician-assisted suicide is never ethically justified, and 50 percent disagreed. Fifty-three percent thought assisted suicide should be legal in some situations, but only 40 percent stated that they would be willing to assist a patient in committing suicide. Of the groups surveyed, hematologists and oncologists were most likely to oppose euthanasia and assisted suicide, and psychiatrists were most likely to support these practices.

Conclusions: The attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia of physicians in Washington State are polarized. A slight majority favors legalizing physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in at least some situations, but most would be unwilling to participate in these practices themselves.”[13][14]

As can be seen, many physicians actually support a policy of euthanasia. Other studies support that a smaller percentage of patients would either appreciate euthanasia as one of their offered treatment options, or agree with it in concept.[15] While it is true that there are problems with adherence to safety guidelines[16], these could be worked out with coherent and well-enforced policy, and seem to be no greater than those problems that face other aspects of medicine (i.e. IRB review of research subject eligibility, etc.).[17] [18]

I think that Dr. Trevor Mudge, Vice President of the Australian Medical Association, hit it very close when he said that “the basis is that the risk to society of allowing for the first time one section of society to kill another without the balancing intent of saving other lives, which is the situation with the termination of pregnancy or capital punishment, if you believe in it, with just war and self-defense. In all those situations where society allows, if you like, a killing, the justification is the preservation of other lives. In euthanasia it is not. The risk to society and the risk to the security and confidence that the public have in the medical profession is simply too great.”[19] This is part of the discomfort people have to supporting euthanasia, and coupled with the general consensus that killing in general is wrong, and that specifically physicians should not be allowed to kill (because their perceived ‘primary directive’ is to “save lives” in all cases), the reasons against such policy are compelling, at least on the surface. However, once critically considered, the position is not as negative as it appears, is coherent, and it is thus greatly beneficial to a certain population of patients (such as those terminally ill patients suffering great pain) that euthanasia be an option. It is certainly within the scope of the role of a physician, and doesn’t violate the role of a physician in society. It respects patient’s autonomy and rights, and thus should be upheld. Dr. John Freeman succinctly sums up the discussion when he says, “It is time that society and medicine stopped perpetuating the fiction that withholding treatment is ethically different from terminating a life. It is time that society begin to discuss mechanisms by which we can alleviate the pain and suffering for those individuals whom we cannot help.”[20] I would add to this that it is time society and medicine seriously reflect on the legitimacy of active euthanasia, and finally make a decision in favor of patients and their right to die.

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[1] James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia”, from Bonnie Steinbock and Alistair Norcross, Killing and Letting Die, New York: Fordham University Press, 1994. 112

[2] See Thomas Sullivan’s Active and Passive Euthanasia: An Impertinent Distinction?

[3] James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia”, from Bonnie Steinbock and Alistair Norcross, Killing and Letting Die, New York: Fordham University Press, 1994. 115

[4] See James Rachel’s example of Jack, a suffering cancer patient who wished to be euthanized, in More Impertinent Distinctions and a Defense of Active Euthanasia.

[5] Jonathan Bennett, “Negation and Abstention: Two Theories of Allowing”, from Bonnie Steinbock and Alistair Norcross, Killing and Letting Die, New York: Fordham University Press, 1994. 239

[6] See Jeff McMahan, Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid.

[7] Some discussion here could be devoted to the Doctrine of Double Effect and its refutations, but I will ignore these considerations in light of refraining the scope of this paper to the topic at hand. Also, since euthanasia cases don’t involve the foreseen death of one person as a consequence of saving another, this doctrine does not apply here.

[8] AMA Code of Ethics, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8458.html

[9] A possibility I credit to Alastair Norcross

[10] Ibid, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8457.html

[11] See the recent Terri Schiavo debacle as evidence, where it was upheld by a supreme court decision that the removal of a feeding tube was both constitutional and in the patients best interest, and the removal was done not just with death as a foreseeable consequence, but with the intention of ending Terri Schiavo’s life.

[12] Obviously there is substantial argument on whether a right to die exists, and for the purposes of this paper I have assumed that one does, though certainly utilitarian considerations could come into play in support of such a position, as well as pragmatic consideration, and analysis of rights we currently believe we have being analogous to a right to die. In any case, this paper is meant to show that the current policy prohibiting euthanasia rests on impertinent moral distinctions and is inconsistent with other ethical policies physicians’ support, not to posit an argument in support of the right to die. I am using the term here in the practical, autonomous way, as opposed to an absolute right. It also seems that, because the patients has a right to withdraw treatment and die, he has at least a prima facie right to die, but again, this is unnecessary to the current debate.

[13] Cohen J. S., Fihn S. D., Boyko E. J., Jonsen A. R., Wood R. W. Attitudes toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia among Physicians in Washington State. N Engl J Med 1994; 331:89-94, Jul 14, 1994.

[14] See also, Kavanaugh A., Wilson K. G., Chochinov H. M., Toffler W. L., Edwards M. J., Hamilton N. G., Edwards P. J., Robinson S. T., Bachman J. G., Alcser K. H., Doukas D. J., Lichtenstein R. L., Lee M. A., Nelson H. D., Tilden V. P. Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia. N Engl J Med 1996; 335:518-520, Aug 15, 1996.

[15] See Ezekiel J. Emanuel; Diane L. Fairclough; Linda L. Emanuel, Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, JAMA, Nov 2000; 284: 2460 - 2468.

[16] See Ezekiel J. Emanuel; Elisabeth R. Daniels; Diane L. Fairclough; Brian R. Clarridge, The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States: Adherence to Proposed Safeguards and Effects on Physicians
JAMA, Aug 1998; 280: 507 - 513.

[17] For more information, see Robert Young’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia on Voluntary Euthanasia, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/ , 2002

[18] Groenewoud J. H., van der Heide A., Onwuteaka-Philipsen B. D., Willems D. L., van der Maas P. J., van der Wal G., Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands, NEJM 2000; 342:551-556, Feb 24, 2000.

[19] Australian Medical Association media conference, May 26, 2002. http://www.ama.com.au/web.nsf/doc/WEEN-5GB4C5

[20] John Freeman, “Is There a Right to Die – Quickly?” Journal of Pediatrics, 80, no. 5 (1972), 904-905

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On Animal Suffering & Carnivorous Tendencies

The aim of this piece is to promote a world in which human interests are maximized, while at the same time, our indirect duties to animals are maintained. It is directed toward those who believe that it is permissible to consume animals for food, but that we have indirect duties to refrain from the abuse and mistreatment of such animals. It will be argued, on Utilitarian grounds, that the current system of factory farming is in need of revision. My solution to this problem, however, is quite unique. Contrary to the views of many previous philosopher-advocates before me, I shall not argue for a vegetarian lifestyle, nor shall I reach the conclusion that an animal’s life should be given equal consideration as a human’s. I shall maintain that we have a duty to eat more free-range meat, provided that this free-range production does not entail the abuse, mistreatment, and/or suffering of animals (It shall be held that humane killing of an animal does not fall into these categories. I shall not argue extensively this point here, it is to be assumed true for the purposes of this paper.) It shall be shown that such a move would maximize the overall utility, as well as be morally superior to the current system. It shall also be shown that the effects of such a move would be more beneficial than those of a change to a vegetarian lifestyle, as well as having more benefit that simple advocating for animals rights would have.

Let us now discuss the reasons that factory farming is in need of revision, and on what grounds we believe this. The current system of factory farming harms animals in many ways (or, in interest utilitarian terms, frustrates their interests). I believe that animals have an interest in not suffering pain, being mistreated, and not being abused. I do not believe that animals have an interest in life, but shall not argue this point in this paper. As mentioned at the outset, this paper is directed towards those that believe that killing and eating animals is morally permissible, as long as it does not entail the suffering of those animals. This is a position I believe many would be inclined to accept (given that the large volume of meat eaters already accept that eating meat is ok, and many are simply not aware of how the animals are treated.) What exactly is done to these animals in their trip from birth to the store shelves? I shall refer to Engel’s section on Factory Farming and Modern Slaughter: The Cruelty Behind the Cellophane in his The Immorality of Eating Meat, perhaps one of the more concise and informative accounts of factory farming. To quote Engel’s article:

“Before they become someone’s dinner, most farm animals raised in the U.S. must endure intense pain and suffering in “factory farms.” Factory farms are intensive confinement facilities where animals are forced to live in inhospitable unnatural conditions for the duration of their lives. The first step in intensive farming is early separation of mother and offspring. The offspring are then housed in overcrowded confinement facilities. Broiler chickens are warehoused in sheds containing anywhere from 10,000-50,000 birds; veal calves are kept in crates chained at the neck; pigs are confined in metal crates situated on concrete slatted floors with no straw or bedding; and beef cattle are housed in feedlots containing up to 100,000 animals. The inappropriate, unforgiving surfaces on which the animals must stand produce foot and leg injuries. Since they cannot move about, they must stand in their own waste. In these cramped, unsanitary conditions, virtually all of the animals’ basic instinctual urges (e.g. to nurse, stretch, move around, root, groom, establish social orders, build nests, rut) are frustrated, causing boredom and stress in the animals. The stress and unsanitary conditions compromise their immune systems. To prevent large losses due to disease, the animals are fed a steady diet of antibiotics and growth hormones. When it comes to feed, disease prevention isn’t the only consideration. Another is cost. The USDA has approved all sorts of cost-cutting dietary “innovations” including: (i) adding the ground up remains of dead diseased animals (unfit for human consumption) to these herbivorous animals’ feed,, (ii) adding cement dust to cattle feed to promote rapid weight gain, and (iii)adding the animals’ own feces to their feed.” (Engel, 861-863)

Furthermore, many animals receive preventative mutilations. Birds are de-beaked to prevent pecking, their toes sliced off to curtail scratching; pigs may have their tails sliced off, and cows are subject to “tail docking, branding, dehorning, ear tagging, ear clipping, teeth pulling, castration, and ovariectomy” (Engel, 864). This torture continues through the transportation, handling, and slaughter stages, where animals are treated inhumanely, hung upside down from hooks, sliced open, bled to death, and killed without the use of anesthetic or a conscience inhibitor. Again, referring to Engel’s article:

“These animal rearing and slaughtering techniques are by no means rare: 98% of all eggs and poultry are produced in factory farms, 90% of pigs are raised in confinement systems, half of the nation’s dairy cows are raised in confinement systems, virtually all veal calves are crate-raised, and 71% of beef cattle are confined in factory farm feedlots. To see just how many animals suffer the institutionalized cruelties of factory farming, consider the number slaughtered in the U.S. each day. According to The New York Times, 130,000 cattle, 7,000 calves, 360,000 pigs, and 24 million chickens are slaughtered every day. Extrapolation reveals that 8.94 billion animals are raised and slaughtered annually, not counting turkeys, ducks, sheep, emu, or fish. Consequently, over 17,000 animals are slaughtered per minute. Suffice it to say that no other human activity results in more pain, suffering, frustration and death than factory farming and animal agribusiness.” (Engel, 866-867)

Thus, the factory farming system is in major need of reform. The interests of animals are being severely frustrated, and the abuse, suffering, and mistreatment of animals during the process is immoral on utilitarian grounds.

As mentioned above, for the purposes of this paper, free-range is defined as the system of producing animal meat that does not entail the suffering, mistreatment, and abuse of animals. Thus, eating meat from such a system is morally acceptable, is preferable to eating meat produced from the current system, and would satisfy the indirect duties we have to animals. But what benefit, if any, can come from increasing our consumption of free-range meat? If consumption of free-range meat were to increase, the benefits would be extensive. Suppose first that only those who already eat solely free-range meat simply increase their consumption of said meat. This alone would have many positive effects on the system. First, it would force the current operations to increase their production of meat, and also increase the profit levels of such companies that produce meat in this way. This would have an effect of increasing profits while at the same time driving down the cost of producing the meat (as those farms could now get many bulk discounts they couldn’t receive before, receive deals on buying large scale property rights, etc.) In addition, it would cause the distribution of free-range meat to increase, making it more available. More stores would be willing to carry this meat, as there is more of a demand for the product. Another foreseeable benefit would be that perhaps those companies that ran both factory farms and free-range farms would be willing to devote more of their land, business, and efforts to their free-range division. All of these steps would have the effect of increasing utility, minimizing the suffering of animals, maintaining the lifestyle of humans (as they are still able to enjoy meat), and making the world a morally better place. But this is only the tip of the iceberg of change, so to speak. Let us now discuss the effects that would come about if current factory farm meat eaters began purchasing solely free-range meat.

The ramifications of such a move would be overwhelming, to say the least. First and foremost, all of the benefits mentioned above would be drastically increased. The market would drive the production of free-range meat higher and higher, resulting in lower and lower costs of producing such meat, a lower price at the consumer end, and an increased availability of this meat. Areas that currently have no supply of free-range meat would begin to carry it, and this would drive even more persons to switch to eating this meat. Stores would be willing to carry the meat, as they would both be able to maintain (if not increase) their profits, as well as be more morally responsible. Companies that currently produce, transport, and handle factory farmed meat would be able to place more and more of their business in the sector of free-range meat, and they would scale down the factory farming divisions of their companies, as supply would be dwindling. In addition, they would be able to correctly advertise that they were meeting their corporate responsibility duties by acting in a morally responsible way, thus increasing their sales and corporate image. All of this would, of course, contribute to the important change in status quo that we wanted; namely the reduction of animal suffering, harm, and abuse. Yet there are even more benefits of such a system; benefits that may not be readily apparent at the outset, but are secondary benefits nonetheless. For one, the overall average cost of meat would be slightly increased as a result of a move toward more free-range farming of meat (as the cost could never fall to the levels of factory farming – this is the reason we factory farm in the first place – however, the cost of the free-range meat would be lower than it had been before the move). This could have positive health benefits by allowing the limited consumption of meat after the change, or perhaps limiting the intake of high fat meat that typically comes as a result of fattening the cows with cornmeal and cement, among other things. The new, organic, natural meat would be healthier for people, could be lower in added chemicals, and would still maintain the proteins necessary by humans to produce the essential amino acids. In addition, much of the land currently used to grow the corn in order to feed the cows could be freed up, allowing the growth of other natural grains for human consumption (including beneficial crops such as soy, wheat, and beans), and allowing for other free range animals to be raised. These secondary benefits that would arise as a result of a move toward a primarily free-range system would be great.

As has been shown, the suffering of animals would be significantly reduced if everyone were to move towards a truly free-range system. This is not a hard move to advocate from our present position, and this is one significant benefit that my view has over those that advocate vegetarianism and vegan lifestyles. The evidence is overwhelming that the majority of people already find it morally acceptable to eat meat. The consumption of meat is a multi-billion dollar industry, with billions of people eating meat on this planet. They do this largely without the consideration of how animals are raised and treated before they end up on their plates. This does not necessarily mean that they do not care about how the animals are treated, but it does show that they find nothing wrong with the consumption of meat, nor do they find any harm in killing animals for that consumption (It is hard believe that many people believed the meat they ate died naturally.) Consumers of meat products typically are not aware of the abuse and atrocious treatment of animals that occurs in our present system. The advantage my solution has over vegetarianism is that it works within this context to reduce the harm and suffering done to animals. Many people, when informed of the treatment animals receive before we consume them, would be upset, angry, hurt, or maybe remain indifferent. What does seem certain, however, is that the large majority of those would be willing to pay a small amount more for free-range, humanely killed meat if it was easily attainable (readily available). These billions of people would obviously not be willing to become vegetarians, as they clearly see nothing wrong in the act of killing and eating animals, and thus such an argument cannot reduce the suffering of animals. One could counter that they would reduce their meat consumption if informed of the treatment of animals, but as I said at the outset, this would have even less benefit than would converting to and increasing the consumption of free-range meat.

The benefits resulting from the conversion to and increased consumption of free-range meat would far outweigh any utility achieved through a reduction in factory farmed meat consumption. Such a reduction would have far less of an impact on the system of meat production, and would certainly not reduce the suffering of animals as much as someone who switched to eating solely free-range meat. This point is very easy to measure, for even if you reduced meat consumption to one pound of meat a month per person (or to any quantifiable amount), this would still entail that the animal source of that meat suffer, while any amount of free-range meat eaten would not entail any suffering to any animal. Thus, reduction of eating factory meat can never have the positive effects that would come about from one switching to free-range meat. In addition, as discussed with vegetarianism, a person who currently eats meat obviously finds nothing wrong with the killing and consumption of animals. To get a current meat eater to reduce his consumption of meat would entail more effort on his part than would switching to free-range meat, especially when this free-range meat became widely available, as well as dropped in price due to increased consumption. Thus, the charges of alternative systems as being better than my system in reducing animal suffering can be averted. It is clear that the most beneficial system, the system that increases the overall utility, maintains the human interest of eating meat, and reduces the suffering and abuse of animals the most, would be that of a free-range switch. A further objection that can be raised is that we have a moral responsibility to protest against the factory farming system. I believe that one can fulfill their responsibility by simply switching to free-range meat (as I don’t think that negative responsibility is morally equivalent to positive action). However, protesting is not excluded under my system. One can still protest against the factory farming system while eating free-range meat, the two are not mutually exclusive.

The end result of this argument is to show that converting to eating only free-range meat is the most morally advantageous, beneficial, and easiest resolution to reducing the pain and suffering of animals. The benefits produced would be great, and the likelihood of conversion would be high. As I outlined at the start, this paper is addressed to and applies only to those who find it morally acceptable to kill and eat animals, as long as suffering and abuse is not incurred. This is a position that I believe is morally acceptable, and one that I believe that the majority of people on this planet accept. This is evidenced by the very fact that billions of people, the overwhelming majority, eat meat. Little consideration is given as to where this meat came from, or to the conditions under which the animals lived and died. It is clear then that many of these persons would find it more morally appealing to reduce the suffering and mistreatment of animals, and perhaps be willing to take the minor steps necessary to make this happen. Even if they chose to remain indifferent toward the suffering of animals (being amoral), they may still see the benefits of a free-range system through some of the secondary benefits mentioned above, as well as wish to reduce suffering in order to simply make the world a better place (as being amoral is not equivalent with being evil, nor with having no concern with others moral considerations). A good ethical system should be one that can be easily adopted by those persons involved, is internally coherent, is able to be adhered to by rational, moral people with a motivation to do good, and makes sense to a critical philosophical eye. An excellent moral system would be one that could be adopted by a wide range of people, and would involve minimal effort on the part of moral agents to act on it. I believe that my system falls under both of these. We have a moral duty to increase our consumption of free-range meat, and this is the easiest and most beneficial alternative to the current system. So go ahead and eat your steak, just do so in a morally responsible manner. You can, after all, have your steak and eat it too.

Works Cited:

Engel, Mylan. The Immorality of Eating Meat. Louis Pojman, ed., The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature, pp. 856-890.